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Abstract
Every year, federal agencies spend over $500 billion to buy a wide variety of
products and services, ranging from cutting-edge military aircraft to common office
supplies. Supplier performance and sourcing strategies within the Air Force are
distinctively complex due to the wide array of weapon systems and limited number of
suppliers available within the marketplace. Academics and industry experts agree that the
foundation for strong buyer-supplier relationships is a means to achieving superior
performance. However, this dynamic can yield varying results when there are a limited
number of suppliers available. One of the problems which emerges from the critical need
of spare parts is that the delinquent rates increase as the number of approved suppliers
increases. Conversely, although delinquent rates tend to be improved when there are two
or less suppliers, the Air Force is highly susceptible to disruptions in the event of single
sourcing failures. Therefore, the Air Force needs to optimize its supply base by
considering supply risks within relevant laws and regulations.
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I. Introduction

Background
Every year, federal agencies spend over $500 billion to buy a wide variety of
products and services, ranging from cutting-edge military aircraft to common office
supplies (GAO, 2021). Effective and efficient supply chain and inventory management is
critical for supporting the readiness and capabilities of the Armed Forces and for helping
to ensure the Department of Defense (DoD) avoids spending resources on unneeded
inventory, transportation, and the costs associated with delinquent purchases which could
be better applied to other defense and national priorities.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) is clear; we are emerging from a
period of strategic atrophy, fully aware that our competitive military advantage has been
eroding. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in
U.S. national security (NDS, 2018). Therefore, it’s imperative that the Air Force
leverages individuals’ knowledge, expertise, and experiences from operations, exercises,
and education to find innovative solutions for increasing efficiency and removing
redundancies so that we are a more agile and lethal Air Force. The DoD has consistently
experienced weaknesses in inventory management, particularly in the following areas
(GAO, 2015).
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1. Material distribution - challenges in delivering supplies and equipment, including
not meeting delivery standards and timelines for cargo shipments.
2. Asset visibility - weaknesses in maintaining visibility of supplies.
3. Predictive forecasting - lacks the capability to predict maintenance and logistics
requirements to enhance operational needs and optimize the procurement process.
4. Supply chain sustainment simulation tools - simulation tools are poorly equipped
to integrate sustainment flow modeling at the strategic and operational levels.
Supplier performance and sourcing strategies within the Air Force are complex
due to the wide array of weapon systems, complexity of the manufacturing process, and
limited number of suppliers available within the marketplace. These challenges are
further compounded by the strategic planning and budgeting method for the Flying Hour
Program (FHP) which makes it difficult for procurement organizations to accurately
forecast planned spares purchasing, which in turn can shorten the anticipated timeframe
supplier(s) have to deliver the spare parts.

Figure 1. Air Force Flying Hour Program Development and Demand Forecasting
2

As depicted in Figure 1, under “strategic guidance” the President, Secretary of
Defense (SecDef), and Senior Air Force leadership assess the anticipated requirements to
support global and regional operations, training, equipment to support worldwide
capabilities, and a realistic classification of objectives with decision points that include
investments and/or divestments to achieve needed capabilities over the next 30 years
(AFPD 90-11, 2015). The boxes on the left depict the decisions from senior leadership
and the trailing decisions as they flow to procurement planning at the bottom. The
planned FPH drives the demand forecast, which, subsequently, drives the decision to buy
spare parts. Somewhere in this decision process, because of lead times and changing
requirements, the purchasing decisions cannot be reversed without the additional
investment of capital, contract renegotiation, time, or some combination thereof. The
right side of Figure 1 represents the challenges of logisticians and financial managers
within the procurement and contracting community trying to meet the actual demands
and needs of the operational Air Force. The “external forces” box represents everything
that can influence the predicted flying hours from the actual hours flown; these can be
fiscal changes, humanitarian events, contingency operations, and safety issues.
Procurement and contracting officials attempt to use this information to forecast
predicted needs when negotiating contracts and setting delivery dates with this data.
However, unanticipated changes in requirements can yield varying results when there are
a limited number of suppliers available.
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Problem Statement
The Air Force spends about $4 billion annually on aircraft spare parts (Mills et al.,
2018). One of the problems which emerges from the critical need of spare parts is that
the delinquent rates increase as the number of approved suppliers increases. Conversely,
although delinquent rates tend to be improved when there are two or less suppliers, the
Air Force is highly susceptible to disruptions in the event of single sourcing failures. To
help mitigate some of the risks encountered by the DoD, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) established a
government-wide benchmarking initiative intended to improve efficiency and operational
quality across several mission support areas, including procurement (GAO, 2021). This
initiative uses a common set of performance metrics to collect process-oriented
information from federal agencies and are intended to provide agency procurement
leaders with data to help improve procurement process within their respective agencies.
Since then, the Air Force has developed performance metrics for procurement
organizations which are aligned with the OMB and GSA initiatives (GAO, 2021)
1. Cost savings and avoidance;
2. Timeliness of deliveries;
3. Quality of deliverables;
4. End-user satisfaction.
Additionally, the Air Force is currently working on an outcome-oriented metric defined
as Total Acquisition Lead Time (TALT), which is meant to track the identification of a
requirement to the delivery of a capability. However, the Air Force does not currently
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have the technical capability necessary to measure TALT, but there are ongoing efforts to
develop this capability (GAO, 2021).

Purpose Statement
This intended purpose is to delve deeper into an operational Air Force
organization with the purchasing data available for over two thousand contract purchases.
The intent is to identify, related to government purchasing, the ideal number of suppliers
and if delinquency rates are affected as the number of suppliers increase and, conversely,
what impact this has on supplier performance.

Research Questions
In this study, data sets from the 448th Supply Chain Management Wing (SCMW),
were used to investigate the number of authorized suppliers and supplier delivery
performance between major weapon system suppliers and one of the organizational units
responsible for procurement. This study focused on the following research questions.
RQ 1: Does a higher number of authorized suppliers promote competition and improve
supplier delivery performance?
RQ 2: Does contract volume affect supplier delivery performance?

Research Focus
The focus of this research is to use a quantitative framework for examining
supplier performance within the context of federal contracting and defense logistics.
Supplier performance and sourcing strategies within the Air Force are distinctively
5

complex due to the wide array of weapon systems and limited number of suppliers
available within the marketplace. Academics and industry experts agree that the
foundation for strong buyer-supplier relationships is a means to achieving superior
performance (Dyer and Singh, 1998). However, this dynamic can yield varying results
based on the number of suppliers available.

Methodology
This study examines the relationship between the delivery delinquencies as the
dependent variable and the number of suppliers and their contract volume as independent
variables using a logistics regression model. The data is collected from the Contractor
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), provided by the 448th SCMW.
Logistic regression predicts the probability of an outcome that can have one of
two values. The prediction is based on the use of numerical predictors. In this case,
linear regression is not appropriate for predicting the value of a binary variable for two
reasons: first, it will predict values outside of the acceptable range, e.g., outside of the
range 0 to 1, and the residuals will not be normally distributed along the predicted line.
On the other hand, logistic regression produces a logistic curve, but the curve is
constructed using the natural logarithm of the “odds” of the target variable, rather than
the probability. Additionally, the predictors do not have to be normally distributed or
have equal variance in each group.
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Assumptions and Limitations
This study includes three variables: delivery delinquency for the binary dependent
variable and the number of authorized suppliers and contract volume for independent
variables. These variables do not consider the complexity of manufacturing spare parts,
e.g., some parts may be relatively simple to make, while others may be complex or
difficult to produce. Nevertheless, once a supplier has been contracted to manufacture an
item, it is assumed that they are able to meet the contractual delivery schedule.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview
There are many studies on the relationship between the number of suppliers and
their performance. The studies analyzed in this section focus on contemporary theories
regarding supplier performance, supplier relationships, sourcing strategies, and strategic
purchasing. Federal Acquisition Regulations are also briefly covered as they add another
level of complexity to the federal agency’s procurement processes, which operate much
differently than non-governmental organizations.

Supplier Performance
The buying organization’s primary goal in instituting supplier development
activities is to improve the supplier’s performance and capabilities to meet the
organization’s current and future needs (Prahinski and Benton, 2004). The relational view
of the firm provides the theoretical foundation for the notion that strong buyer-supplier
7

relationships are preferred strategies to achieve superior performance (Dyer and Singh,
1998). They described how interfirm dynamics could be sources of mutual benefit and
materialized only through a partnership of the parties involved by arguing that the shared
profits in a supplier and buyer relationship could not be realized by either organization in
isolation. The development and ongoing maintenance of cooperative and committed
buyer and supplier relationships could be a source of competitive advantage.
Commitment to these types of relationships was believed to result in higher performance
on both sides of the transaction.
Supplier development programs (SDPs) are a method to monitor the performance
of suppliers and improve these relationships via bilateral communication, incentive
programs, and the exertion of competitive pressures by purchases when multiple
suppliers exist. Benton et al. (2020) conducted the first large-scale empirical study to
investigate the use of SDPs using structural equation modeling and primary data from
141 first tier North American automotive suppliers. Their results suggested that the SDPs
directly affected the relationship between buying and selling organizations and were key
drivers of supplier performance.
From an interfirm arrangement perspective, Madhok and Tallman (1998)
hypothesized that greater appreciation of the relationship management process was
needed to truly realize the potential value between two firms. This was further supported
in supply chain literature, which postulated that empirical evidence existed which showed
strong relationships, characterized by cooperation and commitment and lead to superior
exchange performance (Prahinski and Benton, 2004; Shin et al., 2000).
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Number of Suppliers
Having the right number of suppliers has been a major consideration of firms for a
long time (Richardsson, 1993; Gadde and Hakansson, 1994). When organizations think
about the correct number of suppliers, they’re often thinking about reducing the overall
number of suppliers. It has been argued that a smaller supply base has many advantages
such as volume discounts, lower administration costs, improved quality, and coordination
(Lemke et al., 2000). Choi and Krause (2006) argued that even though decreasing the
number of suppliers might be beneficial in terms of transaction costs, it might or could
result in lower supplier innovation. The underlying reason for this hypothesis was that
suppliers were potentially able to identify innovative solutions by analyzing information,
which might be available from other suppliers. Coincidentally, Koufteros and
Marcoulides (2007) suggested that a smaller supply base enabled more collaborative
relationships with suppliers and closer ties, which was ultimately able to reduce fears
about opportunistic behavior, and the increased volumes for the remaining suppliers
might increase their motivation to become more competitive within their respective
marketplace.
An important strategic purchasing decision is the selection of an appropriate
number of suppliers for each purchase category (Faes and Matthyssens, 2009; Svahn and
Westerlund, 2009). Richardsson (1993) stated that there were several types of sourcing
modes such as single, dual, and multiple sourcing. Single sourcing might create an
environment in which it is easier to exchange ideas (Cousins et al., 2008). Additionally, it
enables the buying firms to invest in a collaborative relationship with the supplier, which
encourages more commitment and innovation from the supplier’s side (Gadde and
9

Snehota, 2000). Faes and Matthyssens (2009) suggested that single sourcing was the best
sourcing strategy when specialized items and expertise were required. On the other hand,
this can also restrict the buyer’s flexibility to acquire new technologies and innovations
existing in the wider supply network (Cousins et al., 2008). Greater dependence of a
buyer onto a single supplier ties up the buyer’s resources (Walter et al., 2003) and
diminishes its capabilities to develop, specify, and evaluate new technologies, a dynamic
which may eventually deteriorate a buyer’s innovativeness (Sako, 1994; Corsten and
Felde, 2005; Nordin, 2008).
Two suppliers or dual sourcing can be used as an alternative to balance the
counter-effects of both single and multiple sourcing. This is the preferred method for long
contract durations and typically allows for information sharing by suppliers, except cost
information (Choi et al., 2006; Faes et al., 2009; Melek et al., 2015). The primary focus
includes long-term strategic issues, such as the development or sharing of technologies
and, like single sourcing, it can lead to improved relationships with the suppliers.
There appears to be a consensus with multiple sourcing in that the primary focus
is on costs and the objective is to create bargaining power in order to drive these costs
down (Cousins et al., 2008). Multiple sourcing is also useful as a hedge against the risk of
supply disruption (Homburg and Kuester, 2001). However, Newman (1989) warned that
price was only one of the costs affected by competition, and that there could be additional
indirect costs associated with multiple sourcing. An alternative to balance the countereffects of both single and multiple sourcing would be using dual sourcing.
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Strategic Purchasing Performance
In academia, the discussion of purchasing knowledge and integration has been an
important topic regarding strategic roles and the performance of organizational
purchasing. Time and again the primary goal has been to create a competitive advantage
and receive the required items or services when required. Carter and Narasimhan (1996)
empirically showed that, next to essential inputs such as competition level, pricing and
positioning, or marketing, strategic purchasing accounted for 43 percent of the overall
firm performance variance. They argued that the strategic decisions made by purchasing
greatly influenced an organizations competitive advantage.
The first discussions on purchasing's strategic contribution started in the 1970s, of
the function's administrative focus (Carter and Narasimhan, 1996). The first studies
connected purchasing strategy to firm performance and discussed the shift of the function
from tactical to strategic that evolved in the 1980s (Freeman and Cavinato, 1990; Pearson
and Gritzmacher, 1990). Since then, strategic purchasing research has been broadened
significantly, but it is predominantly conceptual or case based instead of empirically
validated (Ellram and Carr, 1994). Carter and Narasimhan (1996) provided a clear and
fact-based definition of strategic purchasing performance and showed that purchasing and
its strategy had a direct impact on firm performance.
Expanding upon these studies, Chen et al. (2004) developed a conceptual model
identifying strategic purchasing, management capabilities, customer responsiveness, and
financial performance as depicted in Figure 2. The hypotheses of the model were from
the perspective of the buyer and identified the links, which were able to be mutually
beneficial when the buyer-supplier relationship was cultivated. They insisted that these
11

relationships were able to facilitate a viable competitive advantage by enabling
organizations to
1. Foster close working relationships with a limited number of suppliers.
2. Promote open communication among supply-chain partners.
3. Develop long-term strategic relationship orientation to achieve mutual gains.

Figure 2. A Model of Strategic Supply Management (Chen et al., 2004)
Chen et al. (2004) proposed the following hypotheses based on the model in Figure 2.
H1: Strategic purchasing will have a positive effect in fostering buyer–supplier
communication.
H2: Strategic purchasing will have a positive effect in fostering close relationships with a
limited number of suppliers.
H3: Strategic purchasing will have a positive effect in fostering long-term buyer–supplier
relationships.
H4: Close working relationships with a limited number of suppliers will have a positive
effect on customer responsiveness.
12

H5: Communication between buyers and supplier will have a positive effect on customer
responsiveness.
H6: Long-term relationship orientation will have a positive effect on customer
responsiveness.
H7: Customer responsiveness is positively related to buyer firm’s financial performance.
Schütz et al., (2019), examined 179 purchasing relationships using savings data
and internal client ratings of purchasing knowledge, purchasing integration, and strategic
purchasing performance from a large European multinational utility company. Previous
supply chain research suggested that higher levels of knowledge positively influenced
financial performance (Birou et al., 2011; Fugate et al., 2009; Germain et al., 2001). They
showed that purchasing knowledge was a major precursor for both savings and strategic
purchasing performance and conclude that high levels of purchasing integration are a true
facilitator for savings performance.

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FARs)
There is an extensive list of regulatory and compliance requirements which
companies must observe if they are government suppliers. Noncompliance indicates that
the government may be assuming additional risk, particularly, if cases where it is only a
sole supplier. Federal agencies have the authority to procure products and services in
support of their respective missions and activities. Agencies award contracts that specify
the government’s requirements, price and payment arrangements, and other terms and
conditions. FAR states that the federal acquisition system will satisfy the customer in
terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or service and states that
13

the principal customers of the federal acquisition system are the users and line managers
acting on behalf of the American taxpayer (FAR 1.102-2, 2022).
The federal acquisition system must be responsive and adaptive to customer
needs, concerns, feedback, and the agency head is responsible to contract for authorized
supplies and services unless specifically prohibited by another provision of law,
authority, or responsibility (FAR 1.601, 2022). The agency head may establish
contracting activities and delegate broad authority to heads of such contracting activities
to manage the agency’s contracting functions.
Due to the requirement for the government to monitor compliance within their
supply chain as part of day-to-day risk management, the Services Acquisition Reform
Act (SARA) has been established to provide federal agencies with tools to optimize
mission performance by creating Senior Procurement Executives (SPE) who are
generally responsible for
1. Ensuring that procurement goals align with agencies’ missions;
2. Establishing procurement policies;
3. Managing the agencies’ procurement activities.

III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the study design, variable coding, and the methodology
that best meets the requirements to answer the research questions of interest. Logistic
regression is discussed as it is used for analyzing data.
14

Data
The 448th SCMW provides the planning and execution of depot-level repairable
and consumable spare parts to sustain Air Force Programmed Depot Maintenance
(AFPDM) operations, which includes more than 5,000 aircraft and 16,000 engines. The
wing also provides spare parts to sustain a credible and responsive Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile capability, a wide range of support equipment, and Space and C3I
systems (SCMW, 2022).
The purpose of this study is to understand the effects of the number of authorized
suppliers and their contract volume on their delivery performance. To analyze supplier
delivery performance, this study uses the data set provided by the 448th SCMW, which
contains information for 138 suppliers covering 2,147 contracts. Tables 1, 2, and 3
present the descriptive statistics for the variables in this study.

Table 1. Number of Authorized Suppliers

Frequency
1 or 2 suppliers
1,103
3 or more suppliers
1,044
Total
2,147

Percent
54.10
48.60
100.00

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
51.40
51.40
48.60
100.00
100.00

Table 1 shows the number of authorized suppliers per contract in two groups,
which will be one of two independent variables. 1,103 contracts in one group include one
or two authorized suppliers, which comprise 54.1 percent. The remaining 1,044 contracts
in the other group have three or more authorized suppliers. These two groups include
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similar number of contracts or observations. This variable is a binary independent
variable.

Table 2. Delivery Delinquency

Frequency
On Time
413
Delinquent
1,734
Total
2,147

Percent
19.20
80.80
100.00

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
19.20
19.20
80.80
100.00
100.00

Table 2 shows a measure of delivery performance, which will be the dependent
variable in a logistics regression model. Out of 2,147 contracts, only 413 contracts or
19.2 percent were delivered on time. The remaining 1,734 contracts or 80.8 percent were
delinquent.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on Contract Volume
Supplier Contract Volume
Valid N (listwise)

N
Minimum Maximum
2,147
1
1,439
2,147

Mean
Std. Deviation
88.100
186.398

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the contract volume that is the second
independent variable. The range of this variable is 1,438 with the standard deviation
186.398 that is more than twice of the mean. This variable shows wide variability.
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Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is used to determine if independent variables have effects on
the binary dependent variables and is a modification of linear regression for two-group
classification. It is derived from the sigmoid function, which assumes that the data is
normally distributed. Logistics regression predicts a group or class using a probability
value between zero and one, which is easier to work with and interpret. The dependent
variable for this logistics regression model is “delinquent,” which is coded as “0” for ontime delivery and “1” for late or delinquent delivery. The number of suppliers was also
coded as “0” for 1 or 2 suppliers and “1” for 3 or more suppliers to determine if the
number of available suppliers has any effect on performance. The mathematical model
for logistic regression in this study is defined as follows:
𝑦 = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑥" + 𝛽# 𝑥# + 𝜀

(1)

“y” is the dependent variable that is binary. “𝛽! ” is constant. “𝛽" ” and “𝛽# ” are regression
coefficients. “𝜀” represents error terms.

Summary
This chapter covered the data and model for this study. The variables chosen for
this study were explained using descriptive statistics. Lastly, the methodology of logistic
regression was reviewed in conjunction with the variables in this study.
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IV. Results and Discussion

Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the statistical analysis results relevant to the research
questions. The focus is to determine if there is a statistically significant relationship
between the delivery delinquency and two independent variables such as the number of
authorized suppliers and contract volume. The dataset was analyzed using logistic
regression to determine how the number of supplier and their contract volume influenced
delivery delinquencies.

Results
Table 4. Model Summary

Step

"-2 Log Cox & Snell Nagelkerke
likelihood" R Square
R Square
1 2,060.965
0.019
0.031

Table 4 shows the validity of the model. Because logistics regression models use
a dichotomous variable as a dependent variable, it is not easy to measure the validity
using 𝑅# . Logistic regression models are fitted using the method of maximum likelihood
that utilizes estimates of the values, which maximize the probability, i.e., 0 or 1 of the
data that has been observed. Dichotomous experiments can only have one of two possible
values for each experiment. There are several measures intended to mimic the
𝑅# analysis to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of logistic models, in this case, Cox and
Nagelkerke 𝑅# is included only for reference, but they cannot be interpreted as one would
18

normally interpret an 𝑅# as they have many computational issues for binary dependent
variables. For logistic regression, classification rates can be decent measures for model fit
indices.
The Likelihood ratio is a test of the significance on the difference between the
likelihood ratio for the baseline model and the likelihood ratio for a reduced model which
is a goodness-of-fit measure for a model. The higher the value of the log-likelihood, the
better the model fit. There are several analogies between linear regression and logistic
regression. Just as ordinary least square regression is the method used to estimate
coefficients for the best fit line in linear regression, logistic regression uses Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to obtain the model coefficients that relate predictors to the
target. After this initial function is estimated, the process is repeated until Log Likelihood
does not change significantly.

Table 5. Classification Table

Step 1

Predicted
Delinquent
Percentage
On Time Delinquent
Correct
0
413
0.00
0
1,734
100.00
80.80

Observed
Delinquent On Time
Delinquent
Overall Percentage

Table 5 is another method to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the logistic regression
model. In this table, the observed values for the dependent variable and the predicted
values are cross-classified. There were 413 contracts that delivered within the contractual
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obligation window and 1,734 contracts that were delinquent. In this case, the model hits
the correct classification rate of 80.8 percent.

Table 6. Regression Coefficients
Step 1

Supplier Contract Volume
Number of Suppliers
Constant

B
0.001
0.640
1.068

S.E.
0.000
0.112
0.076

Wald
6.513
32.517
198.197

df
1.000
1.000
1.000

Sig.
0.011
0.000
0.000

Exp(B)
1.001
1.896
2.910

Table 6 shows the constant and number of suppliers is significant at an alpha =
0.01. The number of suppliers is positively associated with delinquent or late delivery.
That is, if there are three or more suppliers available that can meet the requirements of a
contract, compared to the contracts with one or two suppliers, the odd of delinquency will
increase by 1.896 times. Supplier contract volume is significant at alpha = 0.025. Thus,
the higher the volume, the higher the delinquent deliveries. As noted previously, there
were no missing cases within the dataset.
Supplier relationship management theory suggests it is better to have less
suppliers because fostering relationships is simpler, and costs can be reduced due to
economies of scale. Lemke et. al. (2000) has promoted the idea that a smaller supply base
has many advantages such as volume discounts, lower administration costs, improved
quality, and coordination. However, there are risks associated with a single supplier
approach such as possible decreases in supplier innovation, increased risk of supply
interruptions, greater dependency on the supplier, inability to meet demand, and
increased costs due to dominance within the marketplace which in-turn can lead to the
supplier having excessive power in the relationship.
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In the instances where three or more suppliers exist, the result of this study shows
a higher rate of delinquent deliveries. There appears to be a consensus in the multiple
sourcing strategy in that the primary focus is on costs and the objective is to create
bargaining power in order to drive the costs down (Cousins et al., 2008). Multiple
suppliers within the marketplace are useful as a hedge against a single supplier
dominating the market while minimizing the risk of supply disruptions due to natural
disasters and allowing for more flexibility to deal with unexpected events which could
jeopardize capacity. Competition in the marketplace provides an incentive for suppliers to
improve cost and can offer the purchaser with more bargaining power i.e., when many
suppliers exist, the procurement agent is able to choose the lowest price.
While arguments can be made for both single and multiple suppliers, the result of
this study shows that when one or two authorized suppliers are available, the delinquency
rates are lower. Multiple suppliers can improve dependency, flexibility, and capacity;
however, it can complicate the relationships and increase the resources needed to manage
them. With regards to both sourcing strategies, neither consider the regulatory and
compliance requirements, which companies must observe if they are government
suppliers.

Summary
This chapter presented the results relevant to the research questions. As indicated in the
tables in this chapter, delinquency rates are improved when one or two authorized
suppliers are available. When three or more suppliers exist, the delinquent delivery tends
to increase.
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V. Conclusion

Summary of Findings
The result of this study supports the theories on supplier relationships (Carter et
al., 2008; Chen et al., 2004; Mills et al., 2018). Madhok and Tallman (1998) hypothesize
that greater appreciation of the relationship management process is needed to truly realize
the potential value between two firms. This is further supported in supply chain literature,
which shows that strong relationships, characterized by cooperation and commitment,
lead to superior performance (Prahinski and Benton, 2004; Shin et al., 2000). For large
organizations, the emphasis on relationships and people should be considered when
developing an organizational procurement structure. Many models focus on
organizational planning characteristics such as the multi-contingency design model by
Burton et al. (2015), which considers relationships and people when designing
organizational structure and the impact it will have in the areas of goals, strategy,
coordination, and processes. The bottom line is that relationships matter. By developing
close working relationships with a limited number of suppliers and promoting open
communication and nurturing long-term strategic relationships, the Air Force can achieve
mutual benefits for the parties involved.

Research Questions Answered
RQ 1: Does a higher number of authorized suppliers promote competition and improve
supplier delivery performance?
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This research has shown delinquency rates are improved when one or two
authorized suppliers are available. When three or more authorized suppliers exist, their
deliveries tend to be delinquent. Fewer suppliers may allow contracting and procurement
officers more time for focusing on improving the quality, efficiency, and overall
performance of the core aircraft part suppliers to the Air Force.

RQ 2: Does contract volume affect supplier delivery performance?
This research has shown that supplier contract volume is statically significant at
0.11, meaning that there is a 1.1 percent chance that there is no relationship between
delinquent deliveries and contract volume. Thus, the higher the contracted volume, the
higher the delinquent deliveries.

Recommendation
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) needs to examine why delinquent deliveries increase
as the number of authorized suppliers are three or more on contracts. Contract volume
also contributes to the increased delinquent deliveries. When USAF or Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) prepares a contract, volume may be considered for setting a due date.

Future Research
This study includes only two independent variables and assumes that delivery
dates are coordinated by considering manufacturing complexity. In addition, this study
employs only one supplier performance measure or delivery delinquency. Future studies

23

can improve the limitations of this study by including additional explanatory variables
and various performance indicators.
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